The Ambivalent Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights

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I. Introduction

Recent developments in Canada and worldwide, signal a greater consideration for the interests of users in copyright law and policy. More precisely, exceptions to copyright infringement are becoming an increasingly important legal vehicle to address competing interests between copyright holders and users, as exacerbated by constantly evolving technologies. In *CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada* [CCH], the Supreme Court characterized exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights as *users’ rights*, and not mere loopholes in Canada’s *Copyright Act* [CCA]. In 2012, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the status of exceptions to copyright infringement as *users’ rights* in three judgments that allowed the court to further clarify their nature and scope. In the same year, the *CCA* was amended significantly, including through the addition of new exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights.

In this paper, I investigate the nature of users’ rights as they are laid out in the *CCA* and through copyright jurisprudence, as well as through the interaction between users’ rights, contracts, and

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3 RSC 1985, c C-42.


5 CMA, supra note 1. Most provisions of the CMA came into force on November 7 2012: SI/2012-85 November 7, 2012. See the discussion on the exceptions to copyright infringement introduced by the CMA in Part II.
technological protection measures [TPMs]. What is the significance of the Supreme Court of Canada characterization of exceptions as users’ rights? Are they mandatory? How can Canada be informed by and inform other jurisdictions on the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement? While copyright users’ rights have triggered interest and debate amongst scholars, relatively little attention has been given to defining their precise nature and reflecting on the consequences of their interaction with contracts and TPMs. By this exercise, I seek to enlighten the debate on the place of users in copyright law by emphasizing the growing importance of exceptions to copyright infringement as a vehicle to promote their interests, while providing a cautionary tale through significant shortcomings to achieve this goal.

In Part II, I analyse four exceptions to copyright infringement that were added to the CCA in 2012, with a particular focus on their relevance for consumers and their relation to pre-existing

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7 The effects of the introduction of TPMs on the copyright framework continue to trigger interest and debate: see the discussion on TPMs in Part III B below.
users’ rights, as well as to the traditional powers and privileges attributed to the ownership of copies of copyright works. In Part III, I analyze the interplay between the users’ rights set out in the CCA and how they can be altered or overridden by non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and TPMs. To this end, I refer to selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for the online distribution of books, musical recordings, and films. In Part IV, I investigate the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement: are they rights or privileges? Are they mandatory? I conclude in Part V by reflecting on the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users’ rights to the coherence and ultimately, the legitimacy of copyright law and policy.

II. Acts copyright users can perform without the authorization of copyright holders

Copyright consumers and other users cannot perform acts that are exclusively reserved to copyright holders unless they obtain their authorization or unless the CCA explicitly permits copyright users to perform those acts. In Canada, copyright means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work in any material form, to perform the work in public, to publish the work, and other exclusive rights with respect to performers’ performance, sound recordings and communication signals. Copyright also includes a non-exhaustive list of specific acts such as the exclusive right to communicate a dramatic or musical work to the public, or to rent a computer program or a sound recording embedding a musical work.

Outside the acts exclusively reserved to copyright holders, ownership in copies of copyright works has been traditionally viewed as conferring unlimited powers and privileges to use the copy in any other manner, including the unlimited right to play, view, read, and listen to the work, as well as to transfer ownership in the copies. Through the combination of various factors, the traditional unlimited privileges and powers to play, view, read, listen to, and transfer commercial

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8 See my review of selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part III C below.
9 CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26.
10 CCA, supra note 3, ss 2, 3, 15, 16, 18, 21, 26.
11 CCA, supra note 3, s 3.
copies of copyright works is under increased pressure, especially with respect to commercial
copies distributed online with no physical supporting medium.\textsuperscript{13}

In this part, I investigate the scope of four exceptions to copyright infringement particularly
relevant to copyright consumers that were added to the \textit{CCA} in 2012 i.e., the non-commercial
user-generated content, the reproduction for private purposes, the later listening or viewing and
the backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to these exceptions, the
following exceptions or limitations to copyright holders’ exclusive rights are also relevant to an
analysis of copyright consumers’ rights to commercial copies of copyright works: the non-
substantial part doctrine,\textsuperscript{15} the private copying regime,\textsuperscript{16} the fair dealing provisions,\textsuperscript{17} the
computer programs and technological process exceptions.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{13} Those factors include the scope of the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction and the distribution of
a work (as well as its exhaustion) and the effect of TPMs and of non-negotiated standard end-user
agreements for commercial copies of copyright works. See the discussion in Part III B and III C of this
paper.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{CMA, supra} note 1.

\textsuperscript{15} Since the enactment of Canada’s first copyright act, the \textit{Copyright Act, 1921, SC 1921, c 24, s 3(1)},
copyright has been delineated by the exclusive right to produce or reproduce, perform in public or publish
(if the work is unpublished) the whole or \textit{a substantial part} of the copyright work (\textit{CCA, supra} note 3, s
3(1)). As a result, consumers can make any reproduction, performance in public, or publication of a \textit{non-
substantial part} of copyright works without the authorization of the copyright holders. Acts performed on
non-substantial parts of copyright works are outside the realm of copyright holders’ exclusive rights and
can be performed without compensation to copyright holders and without infringing copyright: See David
Vaver, \textit{Copyright Law} (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) [Vaver, \textit{Copyright Law 2000}] at 143ff; McKeown,
21 at 14ff.

\textsuperscript{16} The private copying regime is an exception to copyright infringement that allows consumers to reproduce
for the private use of the person who makes the copy, sound recordings and certain copyright works
embodied in sound recordings. (more precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer
performance of a musical work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical
work, or a performer’s performance of a musical work is embodied: \textit{CCA, supra} note 3, s 80(1)), onto an
“audio recording medium” as it is defined in \textit{CCA, ibid, s 79}. The approved tariff for private copying for the
year 2011: \textit{Private Copying Tariff, 2011} (Copyright Board of Canada, December 18, 2010), online:
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs-tarifs/certified-homologues/copying-copie-e.html, s 2, defines “blank audio
recording medium” as “(a) a recording medium, regardless of its material form, onto which a sound
recording may be reproduced, that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers for that purpose and
on which no sounds have ever been fixed, including recordable compact discs (CD-R, CD-RW, CD-R
Audio, CD-RW Audio); and (b) any medium prescribed by regulations pursuant to sections79 and 87 of the
\textit{Act}; (support audio vierge).” This permitted use applies to one portion of copyright works purchased by
consumers, i.e., sound recordings of musical works (including performers’ performance of musical works)
and does not apply to other works protected by copyright.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{CCA, supra} note 3, ss 29-29.2. Fair dealing is an exception to copyright infringement under which users
can perform acts with copyright works without the authorization of copyright holders for the enumerated
purposes of research, private study, criticism, review, news reporting, and the recently introduced purposes
and the exhaustion of the exclusive right to distribute copies of copyright works embedded in a physical object, or the first sale doctrine. I have discussed elsewhere the nature and scope of these additional exceptions to copyright infringement, as well as their merit and shortcomings with respect to consumers’ uses of commercial copies of copyright works. I will refer to these additional exceptions as they relate to the four exceptions to copyright infringement that I discuss here, and in my analysis on the nature and scope of users’ rights in the CCA further below.

The four new exceptions to copyright infringement that I examine in this paper allow individual users to perform certain acts for defined purposes without copyright holders’ authorization.

of education, parody, or satire, provided that the dealing is fair. In CCH, supra note 2 at paras 53ff, the Supreme Court in a unanimous judgment by Chief Justice McLachlin, enumerated a non-exhaustive list of six factors that should guide courts and adjudicators on the factual assessment of whether the dealing with a copyright work was fair. The six factors are: (1) the purpose of the dealing, i.e., making “an objective assessment of the user/defendant’s real purpose or motive in using the copyrighted work;” (ibid at para 54) (2) the character of the dealing, i.e., how the work is dealt with (e.g., widespread distribution v. limited copies for private use (ibid at para 55); (3) the amount of the dealing, i.e., both the amount of the work taken and the importance of the work (ibid at para 56); (4) alternatives to the dealing, e.g., the existence of a non-copyright work and whether the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose (ibid at para 57); (5) the nature of the work, e.g., whether the work was published or not or whether it was confidential (ibid at para 58); and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work, i.e., “if the reproduced work is likely to compete with the market of the original work,” an important but not the most important factor to consider (ibid at para 59).

18 CCA, supra note 3, ss 30.6, 30.61, 30.71. The permitted acts revolve around technical issues that are specific to computer programs and to uses that are deemed essential to their proper enjoyment: conversion from one computer language to another and adaptation of the computer program to address interoperability issues, so long as such acts are performed for the consumer or user’s own purposes. The CMA, supra note 1, introduced another exception to copyright infringement which allows copyright users to reproduce any works, only to the extent that the reproduction is temporary and essential to a “technological process” and that it facilitates a use that does not infringe copyright.

19 In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 2012 by the CMA, supra note 1, which amended the CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 15 and 18. In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109 (a). The doctrine is known as the first sale doctrine in the US and as the principle of exhaustion in other jurisdictions. This is the rule by which once the first sale of physical objects embodying copyright works (such as a book, DVD, or a music CD) has occurred with the authorization of the copyright holder, they cannot dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine can be invoked only by lawful owners of copies of copyright works and not by licensees, borrowers or people who otherwise access copies of copyright works. It restricts copyright holders’ exclusive distribution right and does not apply to other exclusive rights, e.g., the right to reproduce the work or to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication.


21 See the discussion in Part IV below.

22 Three of the four new user provisions apply to “individuals”: CCA, supra note 3, ss 29.21- 29.23, while one applies to persons, which includes natural and physical persons: ibid, s 29.24.

23 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29.21-29.24.
The four new exceptions allow acts to be performed on substantial parts of copyright works.24 They co-exist with the fair dealing provisions and may be invoked with these provisions, to the extent that they are applicable.25 The scope of the four new exceptions to copyright infringement permits acts that fall within and beyond the allowable purposes of fair dealing.26 Each of the permitted acts thereunder may fulfill the requirement of fairness under the second step of the fair dealing analysis, although it does not need to be established. The acts need to fall within specific purposes and uses and fulfill other conditions.27 The exception to copyright infringement that pertains to reproduction for private purposes28 is subject to the application of the private copying regime.29 The four new exceptions to copyright infringement do not require remunerating copyright holders, similarly to acts performed on a non-substantial part of the work or acts that are fair dealing, and unlike the private copying regime.30

Most consumers would be surprised to find out that prior to the entry into force of the amendments to the CCA in 2012, adding the four new exceptions to copyright infringement, they were either not allowed to or it was unclear whether they could upload on YouTube their own performance incorporating a latest hit, they could copy their favourite musical recordings on their iPods, or record broadcasts for later viewing.31 These mundane acts have formed part of the everyday life of most copyright consumers for some time now. With multiple technological tools that enhance the overall experience and convenience of the use of copyright works, lawful consumers can reasonably expect that they are allowed to apply these capabilities through the acts they perform on copies of copyright works.

By adding the four new exceptions to copyright infringement, Parliament took steps toward a formal recognition of the place and interests of individual copyright users more than it had ever done

24 I.e., users who perform acts on non-substantial parts do not infringe copyright and do not need to invoke an exception to copyright infringement: see supra note 15.
25 CCH, supra note 2 at para 49.
26 For example the acts authorized under the non-commercial user-generated content: CCA, supra note 3, s 29.21, may or may not fall under the purpose of parody or satire under the fair dealing provisions (ibid, s 29). The reproduction for private purposes (ibid, s 29.22) or the later viewing or listening exception (ibid, s 29.23) may or may not fall under the purpose of research or private study in the fair dealing provision (ibid, s 29).
27 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29.21-29.24.
28 Ibid, s 29.22.
29 Ibid, s 29.22(3).
30 CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 29-29.2, 79-87.
31 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29.21-29.24.
before. The amendments to the CCA in 2012 introduced three new permitted uses without the authorization of copyright holders that only apply to individuals, and a fourth that applies to a person. While the majority of limitations on copyright holders’ exclusive rights or users’ rights either apply to all categories of users, as in the case of fair dealing, or specifically apply to institutional users, the CCA singles out more than ever before a group of individuals that are to be likened to consumers as defined in consumer protection laws. The commercial v. non-commercial dichotomy, a defining factor by which to determine the identity of consumers in consumer protection law, is present only to a limited extent in the four new user provisions and the CCA. The extent to

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33 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.24: “Backup copies.”

34 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29-29.2.

35 Or person acting under their authority, such as “educational institutions”: CCA, supra note 3, ss. 29.4ff or “libraries, archives and museums,” ss 30.1ff.

36 Prior to the entry into force of the CMA, supra note 1, there was one reference to “consumers” under the private copying regime provisions: CCA, supra note 3, ss 79ff.


38 Until recently, the commercial v. non-commercial purpose distinction was present only to a limited extent in the CCA, supra note 3. For example certain exceptions to copyright infringement only apply to actions that are carried out “without motive of gain”: s 29.3. Among the four new exceptions to copyright infringement introduced in the CCA in 2012 and studied here, the requirement of non-commercial purposes is present in the “non-commercial user-generated content” exception to copyright infringement: s 29.21. The 2012 amendments also introduced permitted acts on copyright works for “private purposes,” which is a sphere that does not involve performances in or communications to the public: s 29.22 “Reproduction for Private Purposes” and s 29.23 “Fixing Signals and Recording Programs for Later Listening or Viewing” limit the acts that can be performed on copyright works without authorization to reproduction and fixing.
which the four new user provisions can aptly be called users’ rights is another matter which I explore below in this paper, and so is the extent to which they fulfill copyright consumers’ needs and expectations within the objectives of copyright law. With these general considerations in mind, I will briefly introduce the distinguishing features of each of the four new exceptions to copyright infringement.

A. Non-commercial user-generated content

The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement (familiarly referred to as the “YouTube exception”) allows individuals to perform on any form of published copyright works, for the creation of new copyright works, all acts (but for one) otherwise reserved to copyright holders (i.e., the exclusive right to produce, reproduce, and to perform substantial parts of the works in public). The individuals have rights with respect to these newly created works that are limited to: authorizing other household members to use the works and authorizing an intermediary to disseminate the newly created works, for non-commercial purposes, with proper reference to the pre-existing work. Such use or dissemination must not “have a substantial adverse effect, … on the exploitation … of the existing [copyright] work or on an existing or potential market for it, including that the new [copyright] work is not a substitute communication signals and do not involve communication to the public or performance in public. The fact that permitted acts for “private purposes” apply to individuals only and not persons, as is the case under other permitted acts (e.g., s 29.24 “backup copies” and s 30.6, the permitted acts with respect to computer programs), may also suggest that it precludes that the act be performed within commercial or other non-personal capacity settings. The commercial v. non-commercial dichotomy is also relevant to determine the scope of remedies and damages that are available to copyright holders: ss 32.2 (1), 38.1 (1) (b), 38.1 (1.12), 38.1 (1.2), s. 38.1 (5) (d).
for the existing one.” The individual must also have reasonable grounds to believe that the pre-existing copyright work or copy of it was not infringing copyright.

The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement is the broadest of the four new user provisions in two respects: the wide range of permitted acts that can be performed with respect to pre-existing copyright works and the fact that it is not specifically subjected to the non-circumvention of any TPMs. It confers a special standing to the creation of new copyright works that takes place through the use of pre-existing works (often referred to as transformative acts or uses). The premise is that if the objective of copyright is to promote the creation of works, the use of a pre-existing work to create a new work should be desirable and should be promoted to balance the interests of the pre-existing copyright holder with the ones of the would-be copyright holder. Among the broader group of consumers and users, it favours individuals who generate new creations. I have questioned elsewhere the greater emphasis that is placed on creative consumers, the extent to which this differential treatment is justified within copyright’s design and objectives, and the potential detrimental effects that this has on less laborious users.

The sharp contrast between the non-commercial user-generated provision and the other new user provisions introduced in the CCA that I look at next illustrate that gap.

B. Reproduction for private purposes

The reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement (also referred to as the “MP3 exception”) allows individuals to perform one of the acts (i.e., reproduction) otherwise reserved to copyright holders on any form of copyright works, subject to a list of strict conditions. This user provision applies to a broad range of methods of reproductions, subject to

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44 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.21(1)d.
45 Ibid, s 29.21 (1) c.
46 Ibid, s 29.21.
47 Under US copyright law, whether a transformation occurred, i.e., the creation of a new work when using a pre-existing copyright work, is a favourable element for a finding of fair use in applying the first factor of the fair use provision i.e., the purpose and character of the use (17 USC § 107); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (US Supreme Court).
48 Chapdelaine, supra note 20 at 45-49.
49 See: Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act – Backgrounder, supra note 40.
50 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.22.
51 Ibid, at s 29.22 (2) which defines medium or device as including “digital memory in
the application of the private copying regime that continues to apply to sound recordings and certain copyright works embodied in sound recordings and that falls under its purview.

This user provision does not set any limits on the number of reproductions that can be made, but does require that they be made for private purposes. Because the permitted act is limited to reproduction, this exception to copyright infringement would not permit the user to e.g., communicate copies of the work to the public by telecommunication through the internet. The private purpose required for the exception to apply could also be an obstacle although the scope of use that it allows has yet to be defined. The reproduction(s) need(s) to be made from a non-infringing copy that the individual lawfully acquired (other than through loan or rental) on a medium or device that the individual is authorized to use. Other conditions apply to the handling of the reproduction(s) and the copy from which the reproduction was made. Last but not least, this user provision is subject to the individual not circumventing any access control or copy control TPM in place.

By its dual requirement of ownership of the copy from which reproductions are made and that reproductions are confined to private purposes, the reproduction for private purposes exception applies more specifically to copyright consumers than any of the other user provisions, although its application could extend beyond that group. It also supplements the private copying regime

which a work or subject-matter may be stored for the purpose of allowing the telecommunication of the work or other subject matter through the Internet or other digital network.”

52 More precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical work, or a performer’s performance of a musical work is embodied CCA, supra note 3, s 80(1).
53 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.22 (3), i.e., if the reproduction is made onto an audio recording medium as defined in s 79.
54 Ibid, s 29.22(4) reference to the destruction of any reproductions made from the copy confirms that multiple reproductions are permitted.
55 Ibid, s 29.22 (1) (e).
56 CCA, supra note 3, s 2.4 (1.1).
57 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.22.
58 The individual cannot give the reproduction away: ibid, s 29.22 (1) (d). If the individual sells, rents, or gives away the copy from which the reproduction was made, she needs to destroy any reproduction made from that copy: s 29.22 (4).
59 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.22 (1) (c). CCA, ibid, s 41 defines “circumvent” as performing acts either with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts.
60 By contrast, lawful acquisition of the copy is not required for the non-commercial user-generated content exception and the purpose is broadened to include non-commercial purposes. The later listening or viewing exception would also typically apply to consumers in their use of a service (i.e., broadcasting), but could
that only applies to sound recordings and certain copyright works embedded in sound recordings, and does not cover reproduction on devices such as MP3 players. The fact that it is explicitly subject to TPMs may significantly reduce its scope of application in practice and raises questions about the exact nature of that exception.

C. Later listening or viewing exception

This user provision allows individuals to fix a communication signal or to reproduce a work or sound recording or fix or reproduce a performer’s performance that is being broadcast, and to record a program for later listening or viewing. This exception is subject to a list of strict conditions similar to the ones found in the reproduction for private purposes exception examined earlier. This exception to copyright infringement applies only if the individual received the program legally and does not include work, performer’s performance, or sound recordings received through an on-demand service. The individual can only make one recording, cannot give the recording away, and cannot keep it longer than is reasonably necessary to view it at a convenient time. The individual can only use the recording for her private purposes. Last but not least, this user provision is subject to the individual not circumventing any access control or copy control TPM in place.

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61 Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance, 2004 FCA 424 where the Federal Court of Appeal held that a permanently embedded or non-removable memory, incorporated into a digital audio recorder (MP3 player) was not an “audio recording medium” and therefore did not fall under the private copying exemption of the CCA. This considerably limits the scope of the allowable private copying.

62 See the discussion in Part III B and Part IV of this paper.

63 CCA, supra note 3, s. 29.23.

64 See Part II B of this paper.

65 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.23 (1)(a).

66 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.23 (3) defines “on-demand service” as “a service that allows a person to receive works, performer’s performances and sound recordings at times of their choosing.”

67 Ibid, s 29.23 (1) (c),(d),(e).

68 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.23(1) (f).

69 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.23(1) (b); s 41, defines “circumvent” as performing acts either with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts.
The acts authorized by this user provision have been allowed for some time in the US further to the landmark Supreme Court judgment *Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, where the Court held that manufacturers’ sale of home video equipment was not contributory infringement of the copyrights in television programs. The US Supreme Court arrived at that conclusion, *inter alia*, on the basis that recording a televised copyrighted audiovisual work for time-shifting purposes and for private home use was a fair use of the work and did not infringe copyright. In Canada, recording programs for later viewing did not always fall under the allowable purposes of fair dealing, which explains in part the introduction of this new exception to copyright infringement.

The later listening or viewing exception to copyright infringement legitimizes mundane acts on programs that have been performed in many households for decades. It fills a lacuna in the *CCA* where Canada was lagging behind compared to other jurisdictions. Unlike the reproduction for private purposes exception, it does not target as specifically copyright consumers and their permitted uses of copies of copyright works lawfully acquired. It covers a broad range of users who have, at one point in time, the ability to record programs protected by copyrights and do so for private purposes. The fact that it is subject to TPMs raises questions around the exact nature and scope of this exception to copyright infringement.

### D. Backup copies

The fourth user provision allows persons (which would include natural and moral persons) to make one of the acts otherwise reserved to copyright holders (i.e., reproduction) with any form of copyright work for backup purposes, so long as the following conditions are respected: the person owns or has a licence to use a copy of the copyright work that is being reproduced; it is not an infringing copy; and the person does not give any of the reproductions away. The application of the backup copy exception to copyright infringement is also subject to not circumventing any

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71 Ibid.
72 17 USC § 107.
73 *Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc*, supra note 70 at 455.
74 *CCA*, supra note 3, ss 29-29.2.
75 See the discussion in Part II B of this paper.
76 See the discussion in Part III B and Part IV of this paper.
77 *CCA*, supra note 3, s 29.24.
existing access control or copy control TPMs. With its recent introduction to the CCA, the backup copies provision extends to all copyright works a similar exception to copyright infringement that already applied to computer programs.

The four new user provisions recognize the interests of copyright users in an unprecedented way and validate acts that were previously an infringement of copyright, or the status of which was unclear. A more sobering account of these amendments is that they have been keeping us waiting. The acts that are now permitted are so much part of the everyday life of an increasingly large segment of consumers, with no apparent harm to copyright holders, that Parliament had little choice but to recognize their lawfulness to maintain the credibility of copyright. Does the predominantly narrow scope and piecemeal approach of the four new user provisions, combined with pre-existing exceptions to copyright infringement address lawful consumers’ reasonable expectations and does it reflect the main objectives of copyright? Or, does it instead reflect a copyright-holder-centric approach that is mainly preoccupied with preserving the strength of the copyright holders’ exclusive rights with little compromise? The co-existence of some of the four new user provisions with TPMs and the uncertainty of their mandatory nature bring an important perspective to these questions as I discuss further below in this paper.

Understanding the magnitude of copyright holders’ ability to shape the user rights discussed so far in this paper through contract is critical for a clearer view of the acts that consumers can actually perform on copyright works and the dilemmas they face. Copyright holders’ contracts with end-users also raise broader policy design questions on the effects of copyright holders’ commercial practices, including the use of TPMs on the primary objectives of copyright law. This is what I turn to next.

III. The nebulous interaction between copyright, contracts, and Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)

78 CCA, supra note 3, s 29.24 (1) (c); s 41 defines “circumvent” as performing acts either with respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts.
79 CCA, supra note 3, s 30.6 b.
80 See the discussion in Part III B and Part IV of this paper.
A. Copyright public policy meets copyright holders’ private rights

The interaction between copyright, contracts, and TPMs raises among the most pressing issues in contemporary copyright law. The interaction puts in question the desirable scope of the private rights created by copyright law and the public policy goals that it promotes, as well as the proper level of flexibility that needs to be granted for the commercial exploitation of copyright. The CCA sets the default rules of copyright holders’ exclusive rights in their works that are opposable to all. This includes the exclusive right of copyright holders to authorize any of the acts specifically reserved to them by the CCA. Copyright holders control the exploitation of their exclusive rights and commercialization of their works by granting authorizations including through contracts. In the absence of explicit contract terms, the default rules of the CCA will apply and some terms may be implied between the parties based on the relevant circumstances. In consumer transactions, copyright holders resort increasingly to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. Copyright holders can also control the commercialization of their works by applying TPMs that, in their effect, are comparable to contract terms, while raising distinct issues and debates within and outside copyright law.

As much as the CCA confers exclusive rights on copyright holders, it is by its own design and purpose an incomplete code: more often than not, copyright holders resort to contracts as a vehicle to tailor their copyright to the particular needs of the transaction. This occurs at two

81 CCA, supra note 3, ss 27ff.
82 Ibid, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26.
84 I discuss the nature and content of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements through which copies of copyright works are commercialised in Part III C of this paper.
85 TPMs are comparable to contracts in effect because the physical restrictions they impose on copyright works can beanalysed to a contractual restriction on use of the copyright work. They are different from contractual limitations in that they do not only affect the parties to the contract. They affect all users of the copyright work including subsequent assignees of copies of copyright works to which TPMs apply. They are also regulated by specific provisions of the CCA, supra note 3 that were introduced in 2012; see the discussion on the nature and effects of TPMs in Part III B of this paper.
86 See CCA, supra note 3, ss 13(4); Théberge, supra note 12 at para 12; As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 at para 58: “parties are, have been, and will continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright Act.” In Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at para 117, per Abella J. (to which Chief Justice MacLachlin concurred, as well as Bastarache, Lebel and Charron JJ. on this particular issue): “Other cases illustrate that a copyright
levels. First, authors conclude contracts for the exploitation of their economic intangible rights with publishers, music producers, film-makers, etc. They can assign or license their copyright, in whole or in part, including with respect to the list of their exclusive rights, territory, or the duration of their copyright. The CCA explicitly contemplates this panoply of scenarios. These agreements address the exploitation of the intangible exclusive rights of authors/copyright holders. Second, authors, but most frequently copyright holders, conclude contracts for the commercialization of copies of the copyright works that generally dictate what users are allowed to do with the copies. These contracts are commonly referred to as “shrink wrap,” “browse wrap,” “click wrap,” or end-user licence agreements. In a consumer context, they are typically non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. This is the area where the incompleteness of the copyright code is most apparent, leading to uncertainty about the effects and proper treatment of the interaction between the CCA and the contracts for the commercialization of copies of copyright works. It concerns the exclusive distribution right that was only added recently in Canada to copyright holders’ exclusive rights.

In Canada, the CCA has been described by the Supreme Court in Théberge as the balance between “promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.” How does (should) the law treat contracts for the commercialization of copyright works that expand the exclusive rights and powers of copyright holders or go against the objectives of the CCA or similar constitutive acts? How do we holder’s ability to alienate its interest either through licensing or assignment is perfectly consistent with the statutory scheme. Vertical and horizontal divisibility is, arguably, a hallmark of copyright: see Boucet v. Kyriacopoulos (1964, 45 C.PR. 265 (Can. Ex. CT)).” In a US context, see David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand” in David Nimmer, in Copyright, Sacred Text, Technology and the DMCA (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2003) 267 at 274 (reproducing an article by the same title initially published in (1999) 87 Cal. L. R. 17).

87 CCA, supra note 3, s 13(4).
88 For a description of the various types of standard form agreements of digital products, see: Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Helberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, Bart van der Sloot & Ronan Tigner, “Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts” (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), online: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/digital_conf_en.htm at 65-66. For a summary of the various scenarios under which digital products are distributed see: Bradgate, supra note 83 at 32.
89 In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 2012 by the CMA, supra note 1, which amended the CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 15 and 18. See also supra note 19.
90 Théberge, supra note 12 at para 30.
make that assessment? To what extent is an expansion through contract the normal exercise of
freedom of contract and of privileges and powers of copyright holders and to what extent is it
outside their prerogative or needs to be constrained? Should we make a distinction between non-
negotiated and negotiated agreements, mass-market commercialization and isolated occurrences?

The proliferation of the commercialization of copies of copyright works through non-negotiated
standard end-user agreements, combined with the use of TPMs, has been widely commented upon
by authors, including Margaret Jane Radin, Niva Elkin-Koren, and Jacques De Werra, as
occasioning the “privatization of copyright” or as the techno-governance phenomenon. The fear
is that through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders
supersede the pre-existing copyright regime and expand their privileges and powers. These
concerns fit in the broader discussion of the perception by users that standard form agreements
exemplify the norm, as illustrated by behavioural law and economics research. Superseding the
copyright regime can occur through restrictive terms that also apply to works that are in the public
domain, or that make exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights no longer effective. For

91 See for example, Niva Elkin-Koren, “A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting over Copyrights”, in R.
Cooper-Dreyfuss, D. Leenheer Zimmerman & H. First eds., Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual
195; Margaret Jane Radin, “Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State with
Conflict Between Freedom Of Contract And Copyright Policies: In Search Of A New Global Policy For
On-Line Information Licensing Transactions” (2003) 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 239. See also Marc A. Lemley,
CALR 173; for an analysis of the complex interplay between copyright law, contract and technology, see
12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 39. This interaction is addressed in the context of authors rights in: Giuseppina
D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2010) in particular, chapters 6 to 9 (112-200); Nicola Lucchi, “The Supremacy of Techno-
Governance: Privatization of Digital Content and Consumer Protection in the Globalized Information
Society” (2007) 15 International Journal of Law and Information 192 at 194; Jens Schovsbo, Integrating
Consumer rights into Copyright law: From the European Perspective (2008) 31 J Cons Policy 393 at 398;
at 46-51.

Discussion of Consumer Concerns and Expectations" (2004), online: http://www.indicare.org/tiki-
download_file.php?fileId=111 at 117.

93 In particular, how default rules (and in the present case standard end-user agreements) both respond and
construct social norms and have a normative effect: On Amir & Orly Lobel, “Stumble, predict, nudge: how
behavioral economics informs law and policy”, Book Review of Nudge: improving decisions about health,
wealth, and happiness, by R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein & Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that
example, contract terms or TPMs can limit users’ ability to make a fair dealing or fair use of a work that allow users to, *inter alia*, exercise their freedom of expression through criticism, review, or parody. Its effects on the balance objectives of copyright law become significant in a standardized environment where the commercial practice is widespread.

The commercialization of copyright works through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements is not a new phenomenon. It became prevalent with respect to the commercialization of computer programs in the sixties at a time when their legal protection through copyright was not yet certain. In that context, it was deemed necessary to seek additional protection through contract. Until recently, books, music, and films were commercialized without exhaustive terms and conditions. The landscape is changing with the commercialization of these works through online means of distribution, which can also include TPMs. Given the current protection of books, music, and films under copyright law and the fact that they have been traditionally commercialized without terms and conditions, one would assume that contract clauses that dictated permitted uses of copies would be superfluous, unless copyright holders authorize consumers to perform more acts on their work than the *CCA* allows. Conversely, it would be suspicious if they constrain consumers to perform fewer acts on their works than the *CCA* allows.

Commentators have looked at how various doctrines, within and outside copyright law, provide remedies to copyright users and consumers in the case of contracts (in particular, non-negotiated standard end-user agreements) that tend to expand copyright’s exclusive powers and privileges beyond the statute that creates them. They include the application of the US doctrine of preemption, and more generally of constitutional fundamental rights, of copyright misuse.

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94 Elkin-Koren, *supra* note 91 at 197, where the author notes that the public interest or public domain is an absent consideration in individualized market transactions and that the promotion of these interests cannot be left to the will of market forces alone. I discuss the fair dealing, fair use exceptions to copyright infringement in Part II C of this paper.

95 See: Glen. O. Robinson, “Personal Property Servitudes” 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449 at 1473-1474.

96 Ibid.

97 I discuss the nature and scope of online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part III C of this paper.

98 See the discussion in Part III B of this paper.


public policy, unconscionability, competition and antitrust law, and the doctrine of abus de droit in the civil law jurisdictions. While these doctrines may provide a legal basis for copyright users’ claims in specific cases, they are either too broad or too narrow to address the specific issues and effects of copyright end-user agreements. They provide little guidance and support to copyright users. The detailed analyses of the application of these legal doctrines to the commercialization of copyright works underscore the distorting pressures that private ordering can exercise on the copyright framework. They illustrate the power that the sphere of private ordering enables for copyright holders, with little countervailing force to integrate public interest considerations and with that, the ability of lawful users to perform certain acts on copyright works.

To sum up, the interaction between the copyright regime and contracts raises complex issues because it questions the purpose and objectives of copyright, what its proper scope should be, and how much flexibility is desirable in how copyright is exploited and commercialized. The CCA and similar copyright laws in other jurisdictions say little about this interaction if it is not to endorse an unrestricted freedom of exploitation of copyright holders’ works. The fear is that through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders supersede the pre-existing copyright regime to their advantage to expand their privileges and powers to the detriment of other competing interests that are addressed in the CCA and similar statutes in other jurisdictions. The use of TPMs by copyright holders is a manifestation of the possible extension

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102 Ibid, at 284-289; De Werra, supra note 91 at 273-279.
103 De Werra, supra note 91 at 279-282.
104 Ibid, at 282-286; Lucchi, supra note 91 at 221ff.
105 Guibault, supra note 101 at 242-251; De Werra, supra note 91 at 286-291.
108 Ibid.
109 Marc A. Lemley, supra note 91; McManis, supra note 91; See for example, Elkin-Koren, supra note 91 at 195; Radin, supra note 91; De Werra, supra note 91. For an analysis of the complex interplay between copyright law, contract and technology, see generally Gervais, supra note 91. This interaction is addressed in the context of authors rights in: D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, supra note 91, in particular, chapters 6 to 9 (112-200); Lucchi, supra note 91 at 194; Schovsbo, supra note 91 at 398; Penalver & Katy an, supra note 91 at 46-51.
of copyright through private ordering. The legal protection of TPMs recently introduced in the CCA raises specific issues that I explore next.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{B. Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)}

One of the greatest controversies in contemporary copyright law is around how the implementation of provisions to protect technological measures as required by the \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties} of 1996\textsuperscript{111} disturbs (or not) the fragile balance that needs to subsist between copyright holders’ exclusive rights and the rights of copyright users to copyright works.\textsuperscript{112} The \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties} require member states\textsuperscript{113} to provide “adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures” used by copyright holders with respect to digital works.\textsuperscript{114} The \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties} impose no counterbalancing obligation on member states to preserve users’ exercise of permitted acts on copyright works without the permission of the copyright holders, such as through fair use, fair dealing, and other long-established exceptions to copyright infringement.\textsuperscript{115}

The \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties’} obligations to protect technological measures fall within the broader digital agenda initiated by the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] that seeks to address “the profound impact of the development and convergence of information and

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{CMA}, \textit{supra} note 1 which amended the \textit{CCA}, \textit{supra} note 3 by adding ss 41ff.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{WIPO Copyright Treaty}, 20 December 1996, WO033EN, online: \url{http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P8_189} [\textit{WCT}]; and the \textit{WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty}, 20 December 1996, WO034EN, online: \url{http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html} [\textit{WPPT}]. \textit{WCT} and \textit{WPPT} are commonly referred to as the \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties}.

\textsuperscript{112} For a Canadian perspective on the digital agenda of the \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties}, and particularly the TPM provisions, see Michael Geist, ed., \textit{From "Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright": Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda} (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) in particular chapter 7: Carys Craig, “Locking out lawful users: Fair Dealing and anti-circumvention in Bill C-32” and chapter 8: Michael Geist, “The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the \textit{WIPO Internet Treaties}: An Examination of the Anti-Circumvention Requirements.”

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{WCT}, \textit{supra} note 111 and \textit{WPPT}, \textit{supra} note 111 had respectively 90 and 91 member states as per the WIPO official website reporting of contracting parties: \url{http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/} (last visited July 15, 2013). Canada was a signatory but was not yet listed as a ratifying party. Member states include the US, the EU and Member States of the EU, China, Japan, Australia, and The Russian Federation.

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{WCT, supra} note 111, art 11; \textit{WPPT, supra} note 111, art 18.

\textsuperscript{115} On how this topic and how this void does not allow a balance to subsist between copyright holders and users, see David Vaver, “Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties?” (2007) Case Western L. Rev. 731 [Vaver, “From Owner Rights to User Rights”].
communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works.”

More than 15 years after the adoption of TPMs in the WIPO Internet Treaties, the earlier passions ignited by their introduction are still alive, as illustrated by Canada’s various attempts at copyright legislative reform that finally led to the entry into force of the CMA in 2012.

The controversy around TPMs forms part of the broader debate on the proper balance that needs to exist between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and the public interest, including the rights of copyright users. It includes conflicting views on the scope of the international obligations that the WIPO Internet Treaties impose on member states. Proponents of strong TPMs argue that the additional clout to control access to and use of digital copyright works is essential to counter piracy and is the mere recognition of the principle that copyright holders have the right to control access to their copyright works. For supporters of TPMs, the proper balance

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118 For a summary of the policy and legal debate around TPMs from the perspective of copyright holders and copyright users and the public interest, and about where the proper balance should be struck, see Peter K. Yu “Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention” (2006) 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 13, in particular at 17-19.

119 In the context of Canada recent copyright reform, see for example Geist, supra note 117, and Ficsor, supra note 117.

lies in providing sufficient protection that will promote the future creation of digital copyright works to be disseminated for the benefit of users and the public. Critics argue that access controls were never part of the exclusive rights of copyright holders. They raise concerns about the effect of the legal protection of technological measures on access to copies of copyright works (which may include materials that are in the public domain) and exceptions to copyright infringement, such as fair dealing or fair use. At the wider level of digital rights management, critics fear that TPMs, as protected by law, allow copyright holders to control uses of copyright works (amount of reading, viewing, and listening) that have traditionally been outside the scope of copyright holders’ exclusive rights.

With the entry into force of the CMA in 2012, Canada opted for a higher level of protection of TPMs, similar to the highly contentious regime adopted in the US with the entry into force of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act [DMCA] more than a decade earlier. The CCA now includes a

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121 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 42 at 199; Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users”, supra note 117 at 197. Séverine Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l’univers numérique, 2d ed. (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) [Dusollier 2007] at 384-385, 394-395, argues that the right to control access to the work resides with the owners of the physical embodiment of the work, not copyright holders. 122 David Nimmer, “A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act” (2000) 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, at 739-740, observes: “The lengthy analysis of how section 1201 works in practice leads to the conclusion that its entire edifice of user exemptions is of doubtful puissance. The user safeguards so proudly heralded as securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to achieve their stated goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only users whose interests are truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever technological measures are placed in their path.”; Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users,” supra note 117, in particular at 195. 123 Digital rights management is a broader concept than TPMs that encompasses tracking uses made by copyright holders and identification codes and copyright holders’s signatures of copies of copyright works. In addition to obligations imposed on TPMs, the WIPO Internet Treaties impose obligations concerning rights management information (WCT, supra note 111, art 12; WPPT, supra note 111, art 19). 124 Jessica Litman, “Lawful Personal Use” (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman, “Lawful Personal Use”] at 1872, where Litman states that lawful personal use of copyright works is progressively shrinking in the U.S. She attributes it to successive copyright reform of the last decades and the tracking powers of copyright holders with digital technologies; Niva Elkin-Koren, “Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA” (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law Journal, 1119, at 1143-1144, where the author describes the effect of digital rights management used by copyright holders as redefining the relationship between consumers and copyright holders in a way that is not always transparent to the consumer. It also has the potential of compromising intellectual freedoms. 125 Supra note 1. 126 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), amending 17 USC, including the introduction of §§ 1201-1205 [DMCA]. Countries offering a lower level of protection of TPMs include Japan, Switzerland, and New Zealand: for a summary of the main features of the national implementation of TPMs in Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand, see Geist, supra note 117 at 233-236. The European Union set a framework of implementation for its member states that sits somewhere in the
new infringement with respect to the circumvention of access-controls but not for usage-controls. The TPM provisions provide a list of specific exceptions to this new infringement. The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing circumstances additional to the ones already listed in the CCA, in which infringement by circumventing access controls does not occur. The premise behind forbidding the circumvention of access-controls but not usage-controls is that copyright holders should legitimately control the lawful access to their works. Once this lawful access is granted, users should be able to make any lawful use of the copyright work, including uses that do not require the consent of copyright holders (such as private copying, fair dealing, and the four new user provisions examined in this paper). Users should not be liable for infringement if they circumvent usage-controls to achieve that goal.

At first sight, the creation of a new infringement in the CCA with respect to the circumvention of access-controls, but not for usage-controls, seems to strike a balance between the interests of copyright holders and copyright users by restricting infringement to the circumvention of access-controls. While copyright law may not have granted access-controls to copyright holders in the past, it did not allow users to access copies unlawfully either. This latter issue was addressed in another legal sphere: the criminal theft of a chattel (e.g., copy of a book, music CD), bypassing library loan privileges, henceforth. Because it was not clear that acts of circumvention (including circumventing access-controls of copyright works) would be an actionable wrong – circumvention can take place without any taking or stealing – a new infringement of circumvention of access-controls was introduced. By conferring this new legal protection for access-controls on copyright holders, the two spheres of control (i.e., rights to the physical copy

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127 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1(1).
128 CCA, supra note 3, ss 41.11-41.18. The exceptions include law enforcement and interoperability issues.
129 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.21 (2) (a). The factors that the Governor in Council would need to consider include the extent to which TPMs effectively affect the exercise of fair dealing under the CCA, ibid.
130 See the discussion in Part II of this paper.
131 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1(1).
and exclusive copyright) are now merged under the helm of copyright holders. The expansion of the scope of application of the CCA has made commentators question the constitutionality of TPMs in a copyright framework.  

The appeal of the balance that TPMs seek to strike between diverging interests by distinguishing circumvention of access-controls from usage-controls for the purpose of infringement is short lived. While there is no infringement for circumventing usage-controls for lawful uses, the onus is entirely placed on the users’ ability to circumvent the TPMs with no counterpart obligation to facilitate such uses by copyright holders. Makers of circumventing devices, distributors, service providers, and others are also liable for infringement, which diminishes consumers’ ability to circumvent usage-controls even more, in spite of the lawfulness of their intended uses. Also, the infringement of access-controls under the CCA can occur independently of an infringement of copyright. As one commentator observes, the legal protection of TPMs, as they now form part of the CCA, is blind to the lawfulness of the use. TPMs do not parallel the existing exclusive rights of copyright holders, but rather endorse an indiscriminate lockout approach.

While advocates of TPMs will argue that this is the only effective means to counterbalance digital piracy, a legal framework that allows the combination of unfettered powers of access-controls with exclusive copyright, and that does not place the onus on copyright holders to allow lawful uses of their works by “lifting” usage-controls, tilts the balance toward copyright holders even further and imposes the burden of countering piracy on lawful copyright users. In contrast, countries granting a lower level of protection to TPMs typically link the infringement of circumvention to an infringement of copyright.

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134 See the discussion in Part IV B of this paper.
135 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1 (1) (b),(c).
136 The CCA, supra note 3 makes a distinction between acts of circumvention of access controls which are an infringement of copyright holders’ rights and acts of circumvention of copy controls which are not per se an act of infringement: s 41.1 (1) (a). The effects of anti-circumvention measures make acts of circumvention of TPMs an infringement of copyright holders’ rights, independently of an act of copyright infringement. This is the model adopted by the U.S.: DMCA, supra note 126.
138 Ibid.
139 Those jurisdictions include Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland: see Geist, supra note 117. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first reading 20 June 2005) cl 27, s 34.02 (1)
changes brought on by digital technologies, while preserving the balance between incenting innovation and promoting access and lawful uses of copyright works.

The adoption of a higher level of protection of TPMs in a Canadian context raises a slew of new questions, even 15 years after the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties and their national implementations worldwide; not the least of which is: what is the effect of the newly implemented TPMs on Canada’s copyright users’ rights, as proclaimed in CCH and confirmed in three Supreme Court Judgments in 2012? The legal protection of TPMs creates confusion around copyright holders’ obligations with respect to acts that users can perform without their authorization, such as fair dealing under the private copying regime and the newly introduced four user provisions that I discuss in this paper. Can these uncertainties be remedied through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements? How do these terms address TPMs and users’ rights? This is what I explore next.

**C. Terms of use of commercial copies of copyright works**

Copies of copyright works are made available commercially to consumers with no contractual terms attached to them or, increasingly, with a lengthy list of non-negotiated standard terms of use. In the former case, consumers’ permitted uses of copies of copyright works are dictated predominantly by the application of the CCA. In the latter case, the effect of these terms of use

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140 Bell Canada, supra note 4; Alberta, supra note 4; CRTC, supra note 4.
141 See the discussion in Part II and in Part IV of this paper.
142 This is the case for copies of copyright works sold with a physical supporting medium exchanged hand to hand such as books, music CDs, film DVDs.
143 For example, this is the case for e-books, digital films and digital musical recordings made accessible online with no supporting physical medium exchanged hand to hand: see the Apple iTunes store terms of services for music downloads, film rentals and iBooks, online: http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE; Netflix terms of use for audio-visual entertainment streaming services: online at https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse Amazon.com Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use, online: http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1-l?ie=UTF8&nodeId=200506200&qid=1336750645&sr=1-1 ; and KOBO INC. CANADA TERMS OF USE for the purchase of e-books, online: http://www.kobobooks.com/termsofuse.
144 See Part II of this paper.
varies depending on their enforceability, on their nature and on their interaction with copyright law, and on their treatment by sale of goods and consumer protection laws. For the purposes of this paper, I will limit my remarks on the interaction between a selected sample of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements and exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights as conferred by the CCA. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the debate around the exact nature of terms of use in intellectual property licences, including non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. For the intents of the present discussion, I will assume that the restrictive terms of use are binding enforceable terms.

There are common denominators and noticeable variances between what suppliers permit and forbid consumers to do with copies of copyright works lawfully accessed. The permitted purpose of the uses is most often defined as “personal” and “non-commercial” uses. Consumers are usually forbidden to produce derivative or transformative uses with the copies of copyright works that they lawfully accessed. Also, they have no right to transfer the copy of the copyright work that they lawfully acquired. Consumers are typically not notified of their rights or of copyright exceptions under copyright laws or on how they can exercise such rights. There are indications that copyright holders often disregard those users’ rights or exceptions to copyright

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145 The case law on the enforceability of terms of use varies significantly. The question to be determined inter alia is whether, based on the manner in which the terms were made available to users, it can be inferred that they were agreed to by them. For a review of the enforceability of non-negotiated terms and conditions, Loos & al., supra note 88 at 65-66.
146 E.g., whether they form part of a bilateral agreement or of a unilateral licence will have an impact inter alia on their scope, the remedies available in case of breach, etc.
147 More specifically, whether there are provisions in copyright law that are mandatory and cannot be overridden by contract: see the discussion in Part IV of this paper (in particular Part IV C).
148 I refer here more specifically to how sale of goods and consumer protection laws may affect the applicability of copyright works standard terms of use, including through the application of implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession, prohibitions against unfair terms and information disclosure requirements.
149 The nature of intellectual property licence terms (e.g., bilateral contracts, unilateral licences) is unclear and their treatment is not always consistent. For a discussion on the nature of intellectual property licences and the parallels to be made with tangible property, see: Mark R. Patterson, “Must Licenses be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property” (2012) 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 105. See also Robinson, supra note 95.
150 For a review of the enforceability of non-negotiated terms and conditions, see Loos & al, supra note 88 at 65-66.
151 This is the case of major suppliers of online audio, audio-visual and e-books products, see supra note 143.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
infringement.\textsuperscript{155} The right to make copies of the copyright work for personal non-commercial uses varies greatly from no right to make copies\textsuperscript{156} to the right to make an unlimited number of copies.\textsuperscript{157} There is also a noticeable variance in the uses of TPMs from none\textsuperscript{158} to ones restricting access, ones restricting uses once access is granted, and the ones restricting both the access to and the uses of copyright works. Some suppliers inform consumers of the existence of TPMs on the copies of copyright work they provide to consumers,\textsuperscript{159} while others make no reference to their existence.\textsuperscript{160}

To sum up, non-negotiated standard end-user agreements tend to overlook exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights as they are set out in the CCA and similar statutes in other jurisdictions. To understand the effect of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements on the copyright design, in particular the extent to which they can take precedence over exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights,\textsuperscript{161} requires the investigation of two related questions. What is the exact nature and scope of these permitted uses or exceptions to copyright infringement? Are they mandatory? This is what I explore next.

IV. Exceptions to copyright infringement: rights or privileges? Are they mandatory?

Whether exceptions to copyright infringement can qualify as rights, or privileges or mere defences to copyright infringement is an important component of the broader task of defining consumers’ rights to commercial copies of copyright works. This question is gaining more

\textsuperscript{155} See The Hargreaves Report, which was commissioned by UK Prime Minister in 2010: Ian Hargreaves, “Digital Opportunity, a Review of Intellectual Property and Growth” 2011 at 51, where the author refers to a study that analysed 100 contracts referred to the British Library (i.e. submission by Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance (LACA)) and that demonstrated that contracts and licences often override the exceptions and limitations allowed in copyright law.

\textsuperscript{156} See the Kobo books terms of use for e-books, supra note 143.

\textsuperscript{157} See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 143, where no limits to copy apply to iTunes Plus Products, and users may make as many copies “as reasonably necessary for personal, non-commercial use.”

\textsuperscript{158} See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 143, where it is specified that a particular product, “iTunes Plus Products do not contain security technology that limits your usage of such products.”

\textsuperscript{159} Apple iTunes store terms of use for audio, audio-visual works and e-books, supra note 143, make a general reference to TPMs being applied to certain of the iTunes store services.

\textsuperscript{160} See the Kobo books terms of use for e-books, supra note 143.

\textsuperscript{161} I.e. as they are set out in the CCA, supra note 3, and similar statutes in other jurisdictions: see Part II of this paper.
importance for consumers as the recent amendments to the CCA expand the instances under which copyright users can perform acts without the authorization of copyright holders. Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory is of equal importance in an environment where copies of copyright works are increasingly commercialized through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. I look at these two questions sequentially.

A. The nature of exceptions to copyright infringement

The qualification of exceptions to copyright infringement as rights, or as privileges or mere defences has important legal ramifications for consumers and other users. Based on Wesley Hohfeld’s theory of jural correlatives, lawful consumers have a legal claim against copyright holders to exercise exceptions to copyright infringement that they lawfully access if they are rights, but not if they are privileges or mere defences to copyright infringement. This is particularly relevant when TPMs restrict the exercise of an otherwise permitted act. By contrast, an exception to copyright infringement is a privilege to the extent that it does not impose any duty on copyright holders, such as to facilitate the performance of a permitted act. At the same time, it leaves consumers free to make the permitted use as they please, unless the exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory, and are restricted by contract or by TPMs. If exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory privileges, any attempt by

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162 See the discussion in Part II of this paper.
163 I.e. that someone’s right implies that someone has a duty towards it. A privilege is the ability to do something with no correlation from anyone obligated towards it (no right). For example, a defence to copyright infringement would qualify as a privilege to the extent that it allows a user to perform certain acts without authorization but does not require copyright holders to facilitate the exercise of these acts. See: Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16 at 30-31. See also Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710.
164 E.g., the right to make copies for private purposes or fair dealing.
165 Unless they are not mandatory and have been restricted by the copyright holder in binding agreement.
166 See the discussion further below in Part IV A of this paper on the French cases Warner Music and Mulholland Drive.
167 See the discussion on the nature and effects of TPMs in Part III B of this paper.
168 In the case of TPMs blocking the permitted use, consumers would be allowed to circumvent usage-control TPMs to perform a permitted act, provided that they have the technical ability to do so: see the discussion on TPMs in Part III B of this paper. I discuss whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory in Part IV C below. In the case of TPMs blocking the permitted use, the consumer would be allowed to circumvent the TPM to perform a permitted act.
copyright holders to restrain the exercise of the exceptions is not enforceable.\textsuperscript{169} As a result, mandatory user rights offer the strongest form of protection for copyright consumers and other users, while non-mandatory privileges offer them the weakest form of protection. Between the two poles, a mandatory privilege does not impose any obligation on copyright holders to facilitate the exercise of an act permitted under an exception to copyright infringement, but at the same time, any obstacle imposed by copyright holders restricting the performance of the said act by consumers is non-enforceable, leaving consumers free to perform an act otherwise permitted by an exception to copyright infringement. A user right that can be superseded by contract is weaker in mass market environments where non-negotiated standard end-user agreements prevail, to the extent that it is subject to contract terms that can negate it.\textsuperscript{170}

The Supreme Court of Canada stated unanimously in \textit{CCH}, and reaffirmed in three judgments in 2012,\textsuperscript{171} that exceptions to copyright infringement are “more properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence”\textsuperscript{172} and are users’ rights.\textsuperscript{173} The Supreme Court could have referred to exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights,\textsuperscript{174} but instead it explicitly referred to them as \textit{rights}. This qualification by the Supreme Court of exceptions to copyright infringement contrasts with the one made by courts in France that have held that exceptions to copyright infringement are mere defences that cannot form the basis of a legal claim.\textsuperscript{175} The UK \textit{Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988}\textsuperscript{176} suggests that exceptions to copyright infringement

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{169} Hohfeld, \textit{supra} note 163. On the distinction between mandatory exceptions and mandatory rights, see Dusollier 2007, \textit{supra} note 121 at 483-484.
\item \textsuperscript{170} For a discussion on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement and on their mandatory nature see Dusollier 2007, \textit{supra} note 121 at 477-511.
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Bell Canada, supra} note 4, \textit{Alberta, supra} note 4, \textit{CRTC, supra} note 4.
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{CCH, supra} note 2 at para 48, referring here specifically to the fair dealing exception to copyright infringement.
\item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Ibid; Bell Canada, supra} note 4 at para 11; \textit{CRTC, supra} note 4 at paras 36, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{174} The title preceding \textit{CCA, supra} note 3 ss 29ff, refers to “Exceptions.” Exceptions or defences to copyright infringement is how these limitations of copyright holders’ exclusive rights are commonly referred to: see \textit{Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works}, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, September 9, 1886; rev. in Berlin November 13, 1908, art. 11, 13, 14; rev. in Rome June 2, 1928, art. 11bis \textit{[Berne Convention]} at art 9; The \textit{WCT, supra} note 111, art 10 and the \textit{WPPT, supra} note 111, art 16, also refer to “exceptions” and “limitations” of the exclusive rights of copyright holders.
\item \textsuperscript{175} See the discussion below in Part IV A of this paper on the French cases \textit{Warner Music} and \textit{Mulholland Drive}. See also: Séverine Dusollier, “Copie privée v. mesures techniques de protection: l’exception est-elle un droit ?” note sous Prés. Bruxelles (cess.), 25 mai (2004) 4 \textit{Auteurs & Média}, 338 at 342-344 where the author argues in a Belgian context that exceptions to copyright infringement are not rights.
\item \textsuperscript{176} c. 48.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
are not rights.\textsuperscript{177} The view that exceptions to copyright infringement do not constitute rights in the sense that they implicate duties on the part of copyright holders as per Hohfeld’s theory of jural correlates is also shared by copyright scholars.\textsuperscript{178}

The consequences of the distinction between rights and mere defences to copyright infringement are illustrated in the French case \textit{Warner Music}.\textsuperscript{179} The Tribunal of first instance had ordered the rescission of the sale of CDs for digital music on the basis that the CD, which contained TPMs, could not be used on a specific kind of laptop. The CD contained a notification of the TPMs and stated that it could be read on most CD players and computers. The Tribunal held that this incompatibility with some computers constituted a latent defect under the French Code Civil.\textsuperscript{180} The Tribunal also ordered Warner Music France to remove TPMs from the CDs it distributed as TPMs prevented consumers from making private copies of the digital music. The Tribunal held that this annulled \textit{de facto} the limit set by the legislator on the exclusive right of authors, which allowed individuals to make private copies.\textsuperscript{181} The Court of Appeal reversed the two orders of the Tribunal outlined above.\textsuperscript{182} It reversed the first order on the ground of deficient evidence of the existence of a latent defect.\textsuperscript{183} It reversed the second order on the basis that the private copying exception to authors’ rights was not a right but a defence.\textsuperscript{184} Hence it could not be the basis for the initiation of a claim.\textsuperscript{185} The same approach was adopted by the French Court of Appeal and the

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ibid}, s 28 (1) which states with respect to acts permitted in relation to copyright works: “The provisions of this article specify acts which may be done in relation to copyright works notwithstanding the subsistence of copyright; \textit{they relate only to the question of infringement of copyright} and do not affect any other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the specified acts.” (Emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{178} For a review of the literature and case law on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement see Dusollier 2007, \textit{supra} note 121 at 477-494, in particular at 481-485 regarding the arguments against qualifying exceptions to copyright infringements as rights. See also David Vaver, “Copyright Defenses as User Rights” (2013) Jo Pat Off Soc’y (forthcoming) at 14, who hesitates to qualify exceptions to copyright infringement as rights with correlative duties in Hohfeld terms, or that can be transferred, but acknowledging that they are nevertheless entitlements.


\textsuperscript{180} Art 1641 CcF.

\textsuperscript{181} As per art L 122-5, L 211-3 CPI.


\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid}.

Cour de Cassation in the Mulholland Drive case.\textsuperscript{186} By contrast to the French cases Warner Brothers and Mulholland Drive, can the Supreme Court of Canada qualification of exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights serve as the basis of claims by users against copyright holders who restrict the performance of acts otherwise permitted under those exceptions? Are such exceptions mandatory?

Determining whether exceptions to copyright infringement should give rise to legal claims against copyright holders to allow users the performance of the restricted act, as opposed to a privilege, calls in question the balance that needs to be achieved between the scope of copyright holders’ and users’ rights to lawful copies of copyright works. The role of exceptions to copyright infringement to balance competing interests as it was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Théberge,\textsuperscript{187} was emphasized by the same court in CCH, Bell Canada and CRTC.\textsuperscript{188}

The qualification by the Supreme Court of exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights in CCH, and subsequently in Bell Canada, Alberta and CRTC, has served as a rule of interpretation that gives more prominence than it ever did before to the interests of copyright users.\textsuperscript{189} The rule of interpretation has guided the Supreme Court and lower courts in their determination of the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement.\textsuperscript{190} The Supreme Court relied on its qualification of exceptions as users rights to justify that the allowed purposes under the fair dealing provisions need to be interpreted broadly.\textsuperscript{191} The qualification of exceptions as users’


\textsuperscript{187} Théberge, supra note 12 at para 30.

\textsuperscript{188} The objective of the CCA to balance competing objectives as stated in Théberge, ibid, was referred to in the context of interpreting the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement in CCH, supra note 2 at para 10; Bell Canada, supra note 4 at paras 8ff; CRTC, supra note 4 at paras 64ff. See also Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at paras 88-89.

\textsuperscript{189} CCH, supra note 2 at para 48; Bell Canada, supra note 4 at paras 9-11.

\textsuperscript{190} In CCH, supra note 2 at paras 48ff; Bell Canada, supra note 4 at paras 8ff; Alberta, supra note 4 at paras 12ff, the Supreme Court characterized exceptions to copyright infringement as users’ rights and applied a broad interpretation of the fair dealing provisions to determine whether the alleged infringing acts fell under their scope. In CRTC, supra note 4 at para 69, the Court held that a value for signal regime set up by the CRTC was ultra vires of its powers as it inter alia, effectively allowed broadcasters to control the simultaneous retransmission of works while section 31 of the CCA, supra note 3, an exception to copyright infringement explicitly restricts them from doing so. See also SOCAN, supra note 188.

\textsuperscript{191} CCH, supra note 2 at paras 48ff; Bell Canada, supra note 4 at paras 8ff; Alberta, supra note 4 at paras 12ff.
rights further led the Supreme Court in *Alberta* and *Bell Canada* to hold that exceptions have to be interpreted from the perspective of the user, not copyright holders. More recently, the Supreme Court held that a value for signal regime set up by the CRTC was *ultra vires* of its powers as it *inter alia*, effectively allowed broadcasters to control the simultaneous retransmission of works while section 31 of the *CCA*, a user’s right, explicitly restricts them from doing so. How should *users’ rights*, as a rule of interpretation, guide us in determining whether exceptions to copyright infringement give rise to positive claims against copyright holders restricting their exercise or rather that they constitute privileges?

Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights or privileges requires a closer look at their nature and function. First, the essence of exceptions to copyright infringement is to allow lawful copyright users to perform certain acts on copyright works *without the authorization* of copyright holders with or without remuneration. First, it would seem that as a precondition, the performance of the act being constrained by copyright holders needs to be identifiable as falling under an exception to copyright infringement. While certain acts can be readily identifiable as falling under an exception to copyright infringement, in other instances it may not be clear for copyright users. The delineation of some exceptions is reasonably clear (*e.g.*, private copying regime, reproduction for private purposes, backup copies, exceptions relating to computer programs) while the contour of others is to be assessed on a case by case basis with the development and support of judge-made rules (*e.g.*, fair dealing, non-substantial part doctrine). Second, to maintain the integrity of the essence of exceptions to copyright infringement, i.e., as not requiring the authorization of copyright holders, the circumvention of the obstacle to perform the act (*e.g.*, TPMs) should be both lawful and reasonably accessible.

The lack of certainty i.e., whether certain acts fall within the scope of an exception to copyright infringement should not be a bar *per se* to qualify exceptions as rights giving rise to claims. The acts that are readily known to fall within an exception to copyright infringement should give rise to claims against copyright holders in case of obstacles to their exercise, while the acts for which it is uncertain that the exception would apply could be ascertained later on, *e.g.*, through court judgements. However, the indeterminacy of the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement

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192 *Alberta*, supra note 4 at para 22; *Bell Canada*, supra note 4 at paras 29,30,34.
193 *CRTC*, supra note 4 at para 69, referring to *CCA*, supra note 3, s 31.
raises practical issues to the extent that users will be less prone to assert claims with respect to acts that do not clearly fall within the exceptions than the ones that do, for the fear of being held liable for copyright infringement. Such practical difficulties are not restricted to the exercise of rights giving rise to claims; they also apply to the exercise of privileges.

With respect to the obstacles posed by TPMs on the exercise of exceptions to copyright infringement, the introduction of TPMs does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that exceptions to copyright infringement can give rise to a positive claim by users against copyright holders to allow them to perform the lawful act, and therefore qualify as rights in Hohfeld terms. While I have argued above in this paper that the endorsement of TPMs in a manner that disregards the lawfulness of the intended use, strips exceptions to copyright infringement of one of their core features, it is not entirely clear whether the introduction of TPMs in the CCA in 2012 necessarily negates the proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement are rights giving rise to claims. What is clearer is that the introduction of TPMs effectively creates a hierarchy between the exceptions to copyright infringement as I discuss below.

A more central question to assess whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights in Hohfeld terms is the legal base under which users can ascertain their claim against copyright holders. While the CCA provides a myriad of remedies available to copyright holders when copyright infringement occurs, it does not provide any remedies for copyright users. Users could seek a declaratory judgment to confirm that certain uses fall under an exception to copyright infringement but this does not confirm per se the existence of a right giving rise to a legal claim. Users could ascertain claims under other laws, e.g., consumer or sale of goods law breach of an implied obligation of fitness for purpose or quiet possession, but following the reasoning of the French case Warner Brothers, the claim could only be made on the basis that

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194 I.e., not having to ask the authorization of copyright holders to perform the permitted acts. This is particularly true for users who do not have the technical ability or means to circumvent TPMs to perform the otherwise lawful act without the help of copyright holders. See the discussion on TPMs in Part III B of this paper where I describe how TPMs introduced in 2012 the CCA, supra note 3 do not make the circumvention of usage-controls for the performance of lawful acts an infringement of copyright holders’ exclusive rights.
195 See the discussion in Part IV B (i) and (ii) below.
196 See the discussion in Part IV B (i) and (ii) below.
197 CCA, supra note 3, ss 34 ff.
198 See supra note 180.
exceptions to copyright infringement are rights in Hohfeld terms, which remains unclear. The absence of readily identifiable legal procedures and designated remedies under which copyright users can make a claim against copyright users would be a more serious obstacle to qualify exceptions to copyright infringement as rights, than the potential lack of clarity of scope of the exceptions and the introduction in 2012 of TPMs in the CCA.

The recent amendments to the CCA raise questions about the scope of users’ rights that vary between the different permitted uses that the CCA confers to copyright users. I explore next the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement as they are currently set out in the CCA by distinguishing between those exceptions that are not subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are.

B. The scope of users’ rights under the CCA

The amendments to the CCA in 2012 introduced the legal protection of TPMs. The amendments created various new infringements, including the circumvention of access-controls to copies of copyright works. No exception applies to acts of circumvention to perform acts that are specifically authorized by the CCA, such as fair dealing, private copying, and the four newly introduced user provisions that I discussed earlier in this paper. By contrast, acts of circumvention of usage-control TPMs do not constitute a separate copyright infringement.

The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs in the CCA raises additional areas of uncertainty regarding the scope of users’ rights as described in CCH, at least when copyright holders distribute their works commercially with TPMs. Do the exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights subsist in all cases when copyright holders make their copyright works available with TPMs or are they superseded by TPMs as they are now legally endorsed by the CCA? The following analysis does not apply to copies of copyright works that are made available without TPMs. I explore the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement as they are currently set out in

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199 See supra note 163.
200 See the discussion in Part III B of this paper.
201 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1(1) (a).
202 See the discussion in Part II of this paper.
203 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1 (1) (a). See also DMCA, supra note 126, §1201.
the CCA by distinguishing between those exceptions that are not subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are.

(i) Exceptions to copyright infringement not subject to the non-circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs)

The legal status of fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine, and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement are affected peripherally by the introduction of the legal protection of TPMs in the CCA.\(^{204}\) On the one hand, consumers who circumvent access-control technologies and then perform an act that is a users’ right, such as a fair dealing with the work, would be liable for the separate infringement of circumventing access-control technologies regardless of their subsequent lawful use of the copyright work.\(^{205}\) This infringement would have no bearing on the legality of the fair dealing, private copying, non-substantial part, exercise of computer program exception, exhaustion, first sale doctrine, or non-commercial user-generated content, which would be assessed on their own merits. On the other hand, consumers are not forbidden to circumvent user-control technologies to perform those users’ rights.\(^{206}\) In other words, consumers are not infringing copyright holders’ rights if they circumvent usage-control technologies, if their use of the copyright work is otherwise lawful, including if their dealing of the work is fair, or if they wish to exercise the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement.

The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs makes the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights as characterized in CCH even more unclear than it was before. Assuming for the intents of our discussion that the Supreme Court judgment imposes positive obligations on copyright holders to allow the permissible uses (as per the Hohfeldian model of jural correlative of rights and duties), the introduction of the legal protection of TPMs adds a new layer of complexity. One interpretation is that TPMs effectively allow copyright holders who apply usage-control TPMs to override users’ rights (rights understood here as imposing positive

\(^{204}\) CCA, supra note 3, ss. 41 to 41.21.

\(^{205}\) CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1(1) (a).

\(^{206}\) Ibid. the circumvention act is an infringement only if it relates to access-control TPMs, not usage-control ones.
obligations on copyright holders to allow permitted acts) and convert them to exceptions to copyright infringement or privileges. In essence, this amounts to a “halfway house” overriding effect. Another interpretation is that they leave users’ rights as characterized by CCH (and as understood in Hohfeldian terms) more or less intact. While they confer more protection on copyright holders by creating additional hurdles against would-be unlawful users, they still require copyright holders to facilitate permitted uses by lawful users either proactively or at least at users’ request. Even if the second interpretation on the effect of the TPMs introduced in the CCA preserves the effects of CCH better than the first interpretation, this illustrates how the TPM provisions effectively weaken users’ rights. The TPM provisions do so by imposing an additional hurdle for consumers (who do not have the ability to circumvent the usage-controls) to ask permission when the essence of their right is that they do not need copyright holders’ authorization in the first place, let alone the disincentive to exercise those rights and the additional legal uncertainty that the newly introduced legal protection of TPMs creates around the existence and scope of such users’ rights.207 This is unprecedented in Canadian copyright law.

(ii) Exceptions to copyright infringement subject to the non-circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs)

The newly introduced legal protection of TPMs have more drastic effects on the scope of the users’ rights examined here than the ones I analyzed earlier,208 for copyright works that are made commercially available with TPMs. In that case, the CCA makes the existence of those rights explicitly subject to not circumventing access-control and usage-control technologies.209 Consumers and other users can, without the authorization of copyright holders, perform reproduction for private purposes, fix signals, record programs for later listening or viewing, and create backup copies subject to not circumventing access-control or usage-control technologies that restrict them from doing so.210 If they do, the acts they perform no longer fall under these user

207 Hargreaves, supra note 155 at 51 who discusses the detrimental effects that contract terms that restrict users’ rights have on legal certainty about the very existence of those rights which makes him conclude that users’ rights should be made mandatory.
208 I.e., the users’ rights examined earlier are: fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement as discussed in Part II B (i) of this paper.
209 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29.22 (1) (c), 29.23 (1) (b), 29.24 (1) (c).
210 Ibid.
rights provisions and can infringe copyright, unless they are authorized under other provisions of the CCA. They may also be liable for the separate act of infringement for the circumvention of access-control technologies.

Through the effect of TPMs on the user rights examined in the present section, the CCA effectively creates a hierarchy of users’ rights: unlike the users’ rights examined earlier, the newly introduced reproduction for private purposes, fixing signals, recording programs for later listening or viewing, and backup copies users’ rights are “default rights” that exist subject to copyright holders’ application of access-control or usage-control TPMs. The CCA explicitly allows copyright holders to override these rights through the use of TPMs. That is, even after consumers gain lawful access to the copyright work, copyright holders restraining consumers’ uses through usage-control technologies effectively annihilate their right to exercise one of the exceptions to copyright infringement examined here without copyright holders’ consent (and unlike the exceptions examined previously where circumvention of usage-controls does not amount to an infringement of copyright).

To sum up on the scope of users’ rights in the CCA, the amendments brought on to the CCA in 2012 effectively created a hierarchy of users’ rights, occasioned by the effect that TPMs have on certain exceptions to copyright infringement and not on others. In the first category of users’ rights examined above, users’ circumvention of existing usage-control TPMs to perform their users’ rights will not infringe copyright. In the second category of users’ rights examined above, users’ circumvention of existing usage-control TPMs negates their user right, which is conditional on not circumventing existing TPMs. Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights the restriction of which gives rise to a legal claim leads to another important question on

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211 Such as under the fair dealing provisions of the CCA, supra note 3, ss 29 to 29.2.
212 CCA, supra note 3, s 41.1(1) (a).
213 E.g., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content rights examined earlier in Part IV B (i) of this paper.
214 See the discussion in Part IV B (i) of this paper.
215 I.e. the exceptions to copyright infringement are divided into two categories based on how the existence of the exception to copyright infringement is incumbent upon not circumventing any usage-control TPMs in one case (Part IV B (ii) above) and not in the other (see Part IV B (i) above).
216 See the discussion in Part IV B (i) above.
217 See the discussion in Part IV B (ii) above.
the interaction between the CCA and contracts: are copyright exceptions or users’ rights mandatory? Should a difference be made between negotiated and non-negotiated contracts?

C. Are exceptions to copyright infringement mandatory?

Whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory is a distinct field of inquiry from their nature as rights, privileges or defences discussed above, yet it is equally important to assess consumers’ and other users’ rights to commercial copies of copyright works. While exceptions to copyright infringement confer greater benefits on users if they constitute rights as opposed to privileges, they are potentially significantly weakened if they are not mandatory, especially with respect to consumer transactions subject to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. A mandatory exception makes a contract term to the contrary unenforceable, while a non-mandatory user right can be the basis of a legal claim only to the extent that it has not been overridden by enforceable contract terms.

The mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is an unsettled area of the law that is gaining a revived interest among copyright scholars, especially with the recent introduction of the legal protection of TPMs worldwide. Unlike other jurisdictions, the CCA does not explicitly

218 See the discussion in Part II A and B of this paper. Exceptions to copyright infringement as set out in the CCA, supra note 3 are either mandatory or non-mandatory rights, or mandatory or non-mandatory privileges or defences.
219 Ibid.
220 The significance of the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is illustrated by the French case Studio Canal where the Court of Appeal had ruled that the private copying was an exception to copyright infringement (not a right) but that it was nonetheless mandatory; any attempts by Studio Canal to limit its exercise was non-enforceable. The Cour de cassation, (Cass civ. 1st, 28 February 2006, (2006) Bull civ 05-15.824) overturned the Court of Appeal judgment (CA Paris, 22 April 2005 (2005) JurisData 2005-268600) which had forbidden Les Films Alain Sarte and Studio Canal to apply TPMs that were incompatible with private copying as an exception to copyright infringement, and held that the private copying exception was not mandatory.
state whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory.\textsuperscript{222} Does this silence mean that exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory? To what extent is the user right jurisprudence by the Supreme Court relevant to this question?

The consequence of the absence of explicit reference to the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement gives rise to diverging opinions.\textsuperscript{223} For some commentators having conducted a comparative study on the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, no definitive conclusion can be derived from statutory silence on that question.\textsuperscript{224} For others, the answer varies based on the underlying justifications of the exceptions to copyright infringement. Exceptions that are justified by fundamental rights cannot be overridden by contract, while the ones that are justified on other grounds, e.g., public policy considerations can.\textsuperscript{225} The same reasoning applies to exceptions to copyright infringement that are justified by market failures, i.e., they can be overridden by contract to the extent that the market failure disappears with new technologies.\textsuperscript{226} Relying on the underlying justifications of exceptions to copyright infringement to elucidate whether exceptions are mandatory may not be all that satisfactory given the debate and uncertainty around what the proper justifications should be.\textsuperscript{227}

The jurisprudence by the Supreme Court on copyright user rights may support the proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory, at least with respect to non-negotiated

\textsuperscript{222} For example, this is the case of Belgium copyright law under which most limitations of copyright are mandatory with an exception in the case of on-demand services: \textit{Loi du 30 juin 1994 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins}, online : http://www.sacd.be/Legislation-belge-du-droit-d?lang=fr, art. 23bis. See also EC, \textit{Council and Parliament Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs}, [2009] OJ L 111/16 [Directive 2009/24/EC] where some exceptions to copyright infringement related to computer programs cannot be limited by contract: art 5 (2) and (3).

\textsuperscript{223} See Guibault, \textit{supra} note 101 at 214-240, 263-277; 291, 296-302: based on her analysis of EU and US copyright and other laws, she concluded that there is no definite mean to determine whether limitations to copyright are mandatory or not, unless the relevant copyright laws state explicitly so. De Werra, \textit{supra} note 91 at 336-336 takes the position in a European context, that copyright limitations that are grounded in fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of expression) cannot be overridden by contract but that most other limitations can.

\textsuperscript{224} Guibault, \textit{supra} note 101.

\textsuperscript{225} De Werra, \textit{supra} note 91 at 335-336. See also Dusollier 2007, \textit{supra} note 121 at 507-509.

\textsuperscript{226} De Werra, \textit{supra} note 91 at 336-337.

\textsuperscript{227} The justifications of exceptions to copyright infringement are part of the broader discussion on the theoretical justifications of copy ownership and users’ rights to copies of copyright works: I discuss the various theoretical justifications of copy ownership and users’ rights in Chapdelaine, \textit{supra} note 20 at 199-224. See also De Werra, \textit{supra} note 91 at 333-335 on the debate on the theoretical justifications that withstand the right to make private copies, i.e. the extent to which it is based on the right to privacy.
standard end-user agreements. Through **CCH, Bell Canada, Alberta and CRTC, users’ rights** have become an important tool giving shape to the objective of the **CCA** to maintain a balance between competing interests, as it was enunciated by the same Court in **Théberge**.  

In **CCH**, the Supreme Court characterized exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights as users’ rights, and not mere loopholes in the **CCA**.  

In **Bell Canada, Alberta and CRTC**, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the user rights’ nature of exceptions to copyright infringement and provided further insights into the consequences of this qualification: exceptions as user rights need to be interpreted from the perspective of users, not copyright holders.

Of particular significance to the discussion on the mandatory nature of exceptions is **CRTC**, where Rothstein J. for the majority, held that a value for signal regime set up by the CRTC was **ultra vires** of its powers because it effectively tempered with the balance set out by Parliament in the **CCA** between copyright holders’ exclusive rights and exceptions to copyright infringement:

> “In my view, s. 21(1) represents the expression by Parliament of the appropriate balance to be struck between broadcasters’ rights in their communication signals and the rights of the users, including BDUs, to those signals. It would be incoherent for Parliament to set up a carefully tailored signals retransmission right in the **Copyright Act**, specifically excluding BDUs from the scope of the broadcasters’ exclusive rights over the simultaneous retransmission of their signals, only to enable a subordinate legislative body to enact a functionally equivalent right through a related regime. The value for signal regime would upset the aim of the **Copyright Act** to effect an appropriate “balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” (**Théberge**, at para. 30).”

Commenting on the effects of the CRTC regime on the exception to copyright infringement set out in section 31 of the **CCA**, the Rothstein J. for the majority added:

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228 The objective of the **CCA** to balance competing objectives as stated in **Théberge**, supra note 12 at para 30 as referred to in the context of interpreting the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement in **CCH**, supra note 2 at para 10; **Bell Canada**, supra note 4 at paras 8ff; **CRTC**, supra note 4 at paras 64ff. See also **Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers**, 2004 SCC 45 at paras 88-89.

229 **CCH**, supra note 2 at para 48.

230 **Bell Canada, supra** note 4 at paras 29ff and **Alberta, supra** note 4 at para 22 whereby the Supreme Court stated that the applicability of exceptions to copyright infringement or users’ rights needs to be assessed from the perspective of users. In **CRTC, supra** note 4 at paras 36,58, where the Court reiterated that exceptions to copyright infringement are users’ rights.

231 **CRTC, supra** note 4 at para 67.
“Again, although the exception to copyright infringement established in s. 31 on its face does not purport to prohibit another regulator from imposing conditions, directly or indirectly, on the retransmission of works, it is necessary to look behind the letter of the provision to its purpose, which is to balance the entitlements of copyright holders and the public interest in the dissemination of works. The value for signal regime would effectively overturn the s. 31 exception to the copyright owners’ s. 3(1)(f) communication right. It would disrupt the balance established by Parliament.”232

The Court held that the value for signal regime of the CRTC would “rewrite the balance between the owners’ and users’ interests as set out by Parliament in the Copyright Act.”233 Is the effect by extension, of the majority judgment in CRTC, that copyright holders’ exclusive rights and their exceptions cannot be altered by contract? An important distinction needs to be made between the effects of a regime set out by the CRTC, a public body, and the one established by private parties through contract. However, CRTC may support the proposition that copyright holders cannot override exceptions to copyright infringement through mass market non-negotiated standard end-user agreements to the extent that the effect would be to alter Parliament’s balance set out in the CCA, building on the “fundamental functional equivalence” reasoning by the Supreme Court.234

In parallel to the Supreme Court jurisprudence on users’ rights, the 2012 amendments to the CCA bring another dimension on whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory.235 Given the silence of the CCA on the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, and the uncertain interaction between the 2012 amendments to the CCA and the user rights jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, are their other indicators that can help determine whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory? In my view, the inquiry as to whether exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory requires a different analysis between two categories of users’ rights that is based on their different interaction with the TPMs recently introduced in the CCA.

232 Ibid, at para 70.
233 Ibid, at para 76.
234 CRTC, supra note 4 at para 82, where while the Court in its majority judgment recognized that the regime set out by the CRTC could not amend the CCA, this is effectively what it did, pointing to the “fundamental functional equivalence between the proposed regime and a copyright.”
235 In particular, with the addition of TPMs, and with the hierarchy of user rights that the 2012 amendments to the CCA create by explicitly subjecting the existence of exceptions to copyright infringement to not circumventing access-control or usage-control TPMs: see the discussion further below in Part IV C of this paper.
In the first category, i.e., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, and non-commercial user-generated content exception, there is a reasonable (but not conclusive) argument to be made that those rights cannot be set aside by copyright holders through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. The stronger public policy underpinnings that withstands the exercise of fair dealing,\(^{236}\) the non-commercial user-generated content provisions in incentivizing the creation of new works,\(^{237}\) and the automatic levy that is built into the private copying regime\(^{238}\) could support the argument that these exceptions to copyright infringement cannot be overridden at the will of copyright holders. The mandatory nature of these user rights, at least with respect to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, would be more consistent with the Supreme Court jurisprudence on user rights and the CCA’s objectives to preserve a balance between competing interests.\(^{239}\)

The interaction of these user rights (i.e. fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, and non-commercial user-generated content exception) with the legal protection of TPMs introduced in the CCA also suggests that there is recognition of the special status for these exceptions to copyright infringement. While their exercise may be impaired by the presence of TPMs, the existence of these users’ rights is not subject to the respect of TPMs. It is true that the CCA does not specifically require copyright holders to “lift” their usage-control technologies to allow consumers and other users to perform those acts that are usually permitted without the authorization of copyright holders. At the same time, consumers are allowed to circumvent usage-control technologies without infringing copyright by doing so.\(^{240}\) These accommodations between the legal protection of TPMs and users’ rights, albeit imperfect, may signal Parliament’s intent to make room for the exercise of users’ rights. As I discussed above, the interaction between the TPMs and the users’ rights in question\(^{241}\) would convert them from mandatory rights to mandatory privileges.

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\(^{236}\) CCA, supra note 3, ss 29-29.2, with respect to some or all of the required purposes for the application of the fair dealing provisions.

\(^{237}\) CCA, supra note 3, s 29.21.

\(^{238}\) CCA, supra note 3, ss 79ff.

\(^{239}\) Théberge, supra note 12 at para 30; CMA, supra note 1, Preamble, 6\(^{th}\) paragraph. See the discussion above in Part IV C of this paper.

\(^{240}\) See the discussion in Part IV B (i) of this paper.

\(^{241}\) I.e. the users’ rights examined in Part IV B (i) of this paper: fair dealing, non-substantial part, private copying regime and non-commercial user-generated content.
The mandatory nature of the second category of user rights (i.e., the reproduction for private purposes, fixing signals and recording programs for later listening or viewing and backup copies exceptions) is less probable although there is no clear answer to that question either. As I discussed above, the CCA explicitly subjects the existence of those rights to the non-circumvention of access-control and usage-control TPMs. The second category of users’ rights examined here being explicitly subject to TPMs effectively allows copyright holders to override these rights when they commercialize their works with TPMs. By virtue of an interpretation by extension, copyright holders could also override these users’ rights by restrictive contract terms because Parliament already signalled the non-obligatory nature of these users’ rights. In a more restrictive interpretation, these users’ rights can only be restricted by TPMs: if Parliament intended that they could be restricted otherwise, it would explicitly have stated so.

Beyond the proper statutory interpretation of the consequences of the silence of the CCA on the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, I want to reflect here on the underlying justifications for supporting or rejecting mandatory exceptions to copyright infringement and the implications that each position has on the overall objectives and framework of the CCA. The argument that is frequently invoked against making exceptions to copyright infringement mandatory is that it would impede freedom of contract and constrain the flexibility of how copyright holders exploit their exclusive rights. The arguments invoked to support the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement include the need to preserve by extension in the private contractual sphere the balance between competing interests that is embedded in exceptions to copyright infringement in the statutory instrument through which the state confers exclusive rights on copyright holders. If Parliament believes that copyright holders’ exclusive rights need to be constrained for the benefit of copyright users in specific instances, the scope of copyright holders’ proprietary rights should not be extended at copyright holders’ own discretion, in particular in the case of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. Commentators including Ian Hargreaves recommended that exceptions to copyright infringement

242 See the discussion in Part II D (ii) to (iv).
243 See for example Barry Sookman, “Copyright Reform for Canada: What Should We Do? A Submission to the Copyright Consultation (2009) 22 IPJ 1 at 12ff.
in the UKCDPA be made mandatory to ensure greater legal certainty. By clarifying that exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory would not only ensure greater legal certainty at the statutory level, it would also provide greater legal certainty and uniformity on a transaction per transaction level, giving rise to greater efficiency in the market place.

There are difficulties with the proposition that freedom of contract and copyright holders’ flexibility in how they exploit their exclusive rights justifies overriding the application of exceptions to copyright infringement. First, freedom of contract is for the greater part non-existent in the case of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements which are increasingly present in the commercialisation of copies of copyright works in consumer markets. Second, the flexibility to exploit copyright works needs to be understood within the scope of the exclusive rights that are conferred by Parliament to copyright holders by the CCA. Exceptions or users’ rights are by definition outside the scope of those exclusive rights. Exceptions to copyright infringement serve a specific purpose for the benefit of designated users or users in general. Agreeing that copyright holders can override the application of exceptions to copyright infringement is conceding that they can by their own volition (particularly in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements) expand the scope of the exclusive rights conferred and carefully delineated by Parliament.

Whether we should allow copyright holders to override exceptions to copyright infringement (whether in negotiated or non-negotiated agreements) brings us back to the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement that I investigated earlier in this paper. If exceptions are rights, users should be able technically to transfer them and trade them to the same extent that copyright holders do with their exclusive rights. There are at least two reasons why putting exceptions on an equal footing with copyright holders’ exclusive rights is problematic. First, because an important function of exceptions to copyright infringement is the defence component in case of alleged


245 The argument of legal certainty can also be invoked to support that copyright statutes clearly specify that exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory. In such case, each commercial transaction would give rise to the uncertainty on whether the exception to copyright infringement prevails or whether it has been overridden by contract. Thus the argument of greater legal certainty has more strength to support the proposition that exceptions to copyright infringement should be mandatory as this would give rise to one uniform scenario: exceptions to copyright infringement prevail.

246 See the discussion in Part III C above.

247 See the discussion in Part IV A above.
infringement, is that aspect a tradable commodity? Second, to treat exceptions as tradable commodities assumes that users would be aware that they are giving something up, i.e., something that is outside copyright holders’ exclusive powers and privileges to begin with. In reality, it is unlikely that contracts for the commercialisation of copyright works will notify users of their rights and on the status of the contract clauses overriding them.\(^\text{248}\) From a copyright policy perspective, the highly probable absence of knowledge of users in what they would be giving up at the time they conclude the transaction to access copyright works indicates the need for a different analysis depending on whether the contract is negotiated or not and whether there are asymmetries of bargaining power that need to be acknowledged and taken into account in regulating the effects of copyright holders terms of use on exceptions to copyright infringement.

If exceptions to copyright infringement need to be interpreted from the perspective of users as stated in *Bell Canada* and *Alberta*, how does that inform the determination of their mandatory nature? What are the functions of exceptions in the overall copyright framework? Can we achieve the intended goals when exceptions to copyright infringement can be overridden by copyright holders, especially in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements? By conceding to a diluted version of Parliament’s intent to address the interests of copyright users, i.e. one that is subject to non-negotiated contracts, are we effectively letting the public down on the actual scope of the users’ rights, the list of which was expanded with the 2012 amendments to the *CCA*?\(^\text{249}\)

To sum up on the nature of users’ rights or exceptions to copyright infringement, in Canada, while the nature of exceptions to copyright holders’ exclusive rights has been characterized as “rights” by *CCH*, their nature as such and scope remain uncertain, even more so with the 2012 amendments to the *CCA* that added the legal protection of TPMs. As I argued above, the legal protection of TPMs effectively institutes a hierarchy of users’ rights. The mandatory nature of those rights is also uncertain, but a reasonable argument can be made that they are mandatory in some cases, at least with respect to one of the two categories of users’ rights explored here and

\(^{248}\) See the discussion on a sample of non-negotiated standard terms of use for online copies of copyright works in Part III C above.

\(^{249}\) See *CMA*, supra note 1, Preamble.
when the contract that interferes with those rights is a non-negotiated standard end-user agreement.\textsuperscript{250}

**VI. Conclusion**

The 2012 amendments to the *CCA* and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on users’ rights give an unprecedented place to the interests of copyright consumers and other users. At the same time, a closer examination of the nature, scope, and mandatory nature of copyright users’ rights in Canada reveals an overly complex web of interactions between the *CCA*, TPMs, and contracts that undermines the very existence of users’ rights as we have come to describe exceptions to copyright infringement since *CCH*.\textsuperscript{251} The less than certain nature of copyright users’ rights in the *CCA* is a somewhat desolate situation in light of the recent wave of Supreme Court jurisprudence that displays a greater attentiveness to interests competing with the exclusive rights of copyright holders, i.e., the interests of users and the public.\textsuperscript{252} The unclear nature of users’ rights brought on by the loose ends of their interactions with TPMs and contracts provides a less cheerful perspective on the recent major amendments to the *CCA* that give place more than ever before to individual users and consumers.\textsuperscript{253}

The constraints that are permitted or not disallowed on users’ rights in the *CCA*, leading to questions about their true nature and scope, are not mere academic questions. In addition to leaving consumers in an undesirable state of legal uncertainty and exposing them to increased risk of litigation,\textsuperscript{254} the permitted constraints on their rights dictate to a large extent how copyright holders and intermediaries develop their business models and their offerings to consumers.\textsuperscript{255} The unsettled nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, or the so-called users’ rights, has rippling effects on the scope of copyright consumers’ rights to commercial copies of copyright

\textsuperscript{250} E.g. under the fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated content rights, as they are discussed in Part II and in Part IV B (i) and C of this paper.

\textsuperscript{251} Supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{252} Théberge, supra note 12; *CCH*, supra note 2; *Bell Canada*, supra note 4, *Alberta*, supra note 4; *CRTC*, supra note 4.

\textsuperscript{253} See the discussion in in Part II and Part IV of this paper.

\textsuperscript{254} See Hargreaves, *supra* note 155 at 51.

\textsuperscript{255} On a related idea, see Liu, “Enabling Copyright Consumers”, (2007) 22 BTLJ 1099, where the author describes how clearer affirmation of users’ rights would support the lawfulness of copyright content intermediaries’ act which in turn enable and offer greater support to copyright consumers’.
works as a whole. As an important legal basis to delineate copyright consumers’ rights, the CCA’s uncertain rendering of users’ rights can also have a rippling effect on the effective support that property and consumer law offers with respect to copyright consumers’ claims to commercial copies of copyright works.

The legal landscape of copyright consumers is a maze: the paths of users’ rights include many dead ends. What Parliament created and gave to consumers, it also gave explicit allowance to copyright holders to take back from them, or turned its head away from copyright holders’ ability to do so. Of the four new user provisions, three can be explicitly overridden by TPMs. This significantly compromises their status as rights and makes their mandatory nature less likely. As to other exceptions to copyright infringement, their nature and scope as rights are debatable and so is their mandatory nature. With all these questions in mind, the so-called copyright users’ rights, even when they apply, do not provide much solace to copyright consumers because of all the instances when they may not apply and the legal uncertainty that results there from.

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